Senia Febrica, Ph.D.'s New Publications

Senia Febrica, Ph.D.'s New Publications

Senia Febrica, S.Sos, M.Sc, Ph.D., A senior analyst from Adyatmika Sakti had published a marvelous writings so far. She is kindly to share it with anyone within American Studies Center UI circle. Here are the links for her works:

  1. “Why Cooperate? Indonesia and Anti-Maritime Terrorism Cooperation,” Asian Politics & Policy January 7:1 (2015), pp. 105-130.
  2. “Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: A Troublesome Cooperation?,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8:3 (2014), pp. 64-83.
  3. “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of Indonesia and Singapore.” Asian Survey 50:3 (2010), pp. 569-590.
  4. Back to the Future 187 Feasible Cost-Sharing Co-operation in the Straits of Malacca

  5. Private-Public Partnership to Maintain Navigational Safety and Pollution Prevention Measures in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) Policy Brief for the UN Secretary General at the Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process Meeting, 2015.

P.S: Thanks for coming at American Studies center UI website. We appreciate your presence in our website. We also want to make sure you have a rewarding experience while you’re exploring, evaluating, and copying our works by citing the author's information and this website link. Thank you.

Seminar "Free Trade in South East Asia: ASEAN and Canadian Perspective"

Seminar "Free Trade in South East Asia: ASEAN and Canadian Perspective"

Tanggal 2 Desember, Duta Besar Kanada untuk ASEAN Donald Bobiash membuka lokakarya tentang “Perdagangan Bebas di Asia Tenggara: Perspektif ASEAN dan Kanada” yang diselenggarakan oleh Dr. Suzie Sudarman dari Pusat Kajian Wilayah Amerika Universitas Indonesia. Pada acara tersebut, Komisaris Perdagangan Senior Ross Miller berbagi pengalaman Kanada dalam hal perdagangan bebas dengan para peserta dan Konselor (ASEAN) Stuart Shaw menjelaskan mengenai bantuan pembangunan Kanada melalui perdagangan di Asia. Lokakarya ini juga menampilkan Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana dan Dr. Iwan Jaya Azis dari Universitas Indonesia sebagai pembicara.

Public-Private Partnership for the Safety of Navigation and Pollution Prevention in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Public-Private Partnership for the Safety of Navigation and Pollution Prevention in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Senia Febrica, American Studies Center, Universitas Indonesia

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the shortest sea route between the Middle East and Asia. Currently, around 80 percent of Japan’s and China’s imported oil originating from the Persian Gulf transits through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.1 With busy shipping flows reaching 400-600 ships every day, the problems of collisions and near misses in the Straits are at the heart of public and private actors’ concerns. 2

Public-private partnership is central to improve navigational safety and protect the marine environment in the Straits. The Straits harbours rich marine life including mangroves and coral reefs.3 A number of shipping incidents have taken place in the straits involving major releases of oil and hazardous and noxious substances into the waters, causing destruction to the marine environment.4

Concrete public-private collaborations in the Straits have been carried out through the existing Cooperative Mechanism, a cooperation initiative which emerged as a result of the IMO’s sponsored meetings (2005-2007) on the Straits. Under the Cooperative Mechanism at the 2006 Kuala Lumpur meeting straits states identified six cooperative programs that need to be implemented and cost over US$ 42.8 million.5 These include removal of identified wrecks in the straits, capacity building on Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) preparedness and response, the installation of class B Automatic Identification System on small ships, the development of setting up tide, current and wind measurement systems in 12 locations, and the replacement of aids of navigation including 7 of those that were damaged by the 2004 tsunami.6

1
available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/world_oil_transit_chokepoints/malacca.html, accessed 28 March 2011.

The United States Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca,”

2

Malaysia, 2006), at 28; Interview with representatives of maritime businesses in Singapore, August 2010.

3

2006), at 145

4 5

International Straits,” Jurnal Hukum Internasional 6:3 (2009), at 321.

6

 

Arif Havas Oegroseno, “The Straits of Malacca and Challenges Ahead: Indonesian Point of View” Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of

Anugerah Nontji, “Managing the Marine Environment of the Straits of Malacca”, in Mohd Nizam Basiron & Amir Dastan, Building A Comprehensive Security Environment (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia,

Ibid.

Hasjim Djalal, “The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore”; Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, “Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection 4- 6 September 2007,” available from http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/spore_statement.pdf, accesed 7 September 2012; Hasjim Djalal “Regulation of

 

Ibid.

As part of the public-private partnership, the Aids to Navigation Fund (ANF) has been set up for the long term maintenance of 22 aids to navigation in the Straits’ Traffic Separation Scheme.7 The Nippon Foundation of Japan announced its commitment to provide one-third of the five year costs of the ANF that totals US$ 9 million.8 The Cooperative Mechanism is a useful cooperation scheme to further attract user states and businesses to sponsor projects identified by strait states at the 2006 Kuala Lumpur meeting and future projects to improve navigational safety and marine protection in the Straits.

7

Mohd Nizam Basiron, “Steady as She Goes- report of Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and

Singapore,” MIMA Researchers’ paper (Kuala Lumpur: MIMA, 2007), at 1-2.

8

Ibid, at 2. 

Teknologi Informasi Mengawal Bonus Demografi

Teknologi Informasi Mengawal Bonus Demografi

Pada tahun 2020-2035, Indonesia diprediksi akan meraih bonus demografi, yakni populasi usia produktif lebih banyak dari populasi usia nonproduktif. Namun, Indonesia baru bisa mendapatkan bonus demografi jika memiliki penduduk muda yang pintar. Tanpa itu, Indonesia hanya akan mengalami kutukan demografi.

Syarat meraih bonus demografi memang menciptakan kondisi kelompok masyarakat produktif (15-64 tahun) yang kreatif, pintar, dan inovatif sehingga mampu berproduksi secara maksimal.

Pemerintah Indonesia mengimplementasikan syarat ini dengan kebijakan beasiswa LPDP dan Presidential Scholarship untuk mendorong murid-murid Indonesia bersekolah di luar negeri dan berbakti untuk negara setelah lulus.

Menurut laporan UNFPA, sebuah negara yang sedang menuju bonus demografi akan dihadapkan pada risiko kondisi politik yang tidak stabil apabila tidak mampu merespons keinginan kelompok masyarakat miskin mendapatkan kesempatan yang sama dengan kelompok masyarakat kaya.

Tantangan kedua adalah saat mencapai bonus demografi, Indonesia akan mendapatkan pertumbuhan jumlah orang kritis yang sangat tinggi karena semakin banyak lulusan luar negeri yang berkarya di Indonesia.

Pemikiran mereka akan memengaruhi masyarakat sehingga pemerintah perlu menciptakan ekosistem yang cocok agar mereka bisa bekerja dan berkomunikasi dengan pemerintah. Pemerintah juga perlu membuat kebijakan yang bisa merespons masyarakat dengan lebih cepat, efisien, dan akurat. Bagaimana caranya?

Kuasai informasi

Kuncinya adalah menguasai teknologi informasi untuk berinteraksi dengan rakyat. Awal tahun 1997, Indonesia memiliki proyek ”Nusantara 21”, tetapi tujuan utamanya adalah memperkuat Satelit Palapa untuk kepentingan pemerintah.

Proyek ini terkesan kontradiktif dengan ide otonomi daerah waktu itu sehingga proyek ”Nusantara 21” kurang populer dan terhenti ketika terjadi pergantian rezim.

Pada zaman SBY, pemerintah memakai fasilitas UKP4 dan jejaring sosial untuk mendapatkan input dari masyarakat.

Walaupun kebijakan menguasai teknologi informasi semakin berkembang, Presiden SBY belum memiliki arah kebijakan untuk membangun kabel serat optik secara merata di seluruh Indonesia, juga perangkat keras dan lunak, untuk mengembangkan teknologi informasi.

Berdasarkan perspektifcybersuperiority , kedua perangkat (kabel serat optik dansoftware-hardware computer ) sangat penting seperti halnya satelit untuk memperkuat keamanan, ekonomi, dan kebudayaan Indonesia.

Kita sudah melihat bukti, tidak kuatnya infrastruktur kabel serat optik, satelit, dan komputer di Indonesia membuat negara lain mampu menyadap Pemerintahan Indonesia lewat Satelit Palapa.

Pada era Orde Baru, peluncuran proyek ”Nusantara 21” dilakukan untuk menyebarkan nilai-nilai pemersatuan Nusantara sebagai negara kepulauan. Kebijakan yang diperkuat dengan Keppres No 30 Tahun 1997 ini dikoordinasikan oleh Tim Koordinasi Telematika Indonesia untuk pemutakhiran proyek Palapa.

Namun, pemutakhiran satelit saja tidak cukup. Pada abad ke-21, satelit bukan lagi satu-satunya infrastruktursuperhighwayinformasi yang penting. Kabel serat optik dan perangkat lunak dan keras komputer itu juga menjadi penting.

Tulisan Eom Jeung Ho tentangcybersuperiority  mengatakan bahwa sebuah negara perlu menguasai infrastruktur teknologinya untuk kepentingan militer agar kepentingan negara terjaga dari serangan negara lain.

Konsep ini kemudian berkembang menjadi negara tidak hanya harus menguasai infrastruktur teknologi untuk kepentingan militer, tetapi juga untuk kegiatan ekonomi, kebudayaan, dan lainnya.

Semakin meningkatnya partisipasi rakyat Indonesia memakai teknologi informasi juga menjadi tantangan bagi Pemerintah Indonesia supaya membuat kebijakan berdasarkan kebutuhan rakyatnya.

Partisipasi rakyat yang semakin tinggi dalam teknologi informasi juga meningkatkan risiko kriminalitas dunia maya. Maka, pemerintah perlu juga mempersiapkan kebijakan untuk mengawasi dan menangkal kejahatan internet, sepertihacking , penipuanonline , penyadapan, penyebaran rumor secara masif, dan pencurian informasi.

Peta ”cybersuperiority”

Dengan demikian, penting bagi negara mana pun termasuk Indonesia, untuk menguasai informasi dunia maya sekaligus membuat kebijakan berdasarkan kebutuhan rakyatnya. Untuk itu, pemerintah perlu membuat petacybersuperiorityyang terdiri dari tiga jenis lapisan.

Lapisan paling dasar adalah unsur-unsur kenapa dunia maya disebut dunia informasi, yaitu karena kemampuannya mempercepat, mengawasi, menstimulasi, dan menyimpan informasi.

Dengan kata lain, pada lapisan ini yang penting adalah unsur kognitif seperti kecepatan, simulasi, pengawasan, dan penyimpanan.

Lapisan kedua berupa alat-alat atau infrastruktur yang merepresentasikan kecepatan, simulasi, pengawasan, dan penyimpanan informasi. Umumnya, unsur-unsur tersebut adalah perangkat komputer (PC, laptop, kamera,  handphone, server ), satelit, dan kabel serat optik.

Lapisan ketiga adalah unsur-unsur publik, seperti rakyat, media, perusahaan. Unsur-unsur ini adalah target dari pemanfaatan teknologi informasi untuk kemajuan peradaban bangsa, penyebaran media, dan produktivitas perusahaan.

Dengan membuat petacybersuperiority,  arah kebijakan pemerintah dalam menguasai teknologi informasi untuk kesejahteraan negara menjadi lebih jelas. Lalu, di mana kaitan strategi menguasai teknologi informasi dengan meraih bonus demografi?

Penguasaan teknologi informasi ataucybersuperiority  berperan penting untuk mengawal kestabilan negara menuju bonus demografi dan pasca bonus demografi untuk menyerap dan mengakomodasi keinginan rakyat yang tersebar di dunia maya.

Valerian Timothy

Asisten Riset di American Studies Center, Universitas Indonesia

Perception over the Use of Militarised Non-Governmental Organisations for Port Security in Indonesia

Perception over the Use of Militarised Non-Governmental Organisations for Port Security in Indonesia

Cross-border maritime activities have long shaped Indonesia’s economic, social and political development. As an archipelagic country with 95,181 kilometres of coastline, Indonesia’s national borders are primarily located at sea.[1] Over 90 per cent of Indonesia’s national and international trade is conducted across the country’s vast maritime borders. Ports have become the site of interactions in Indonesia’s maritime borders and gateways for the country’s export and import activities. 

Efforts to improve port security are not only a matter of national security concern for Indonesia. They are important for the international community because the country occupies a vitally important position in global maritime transportation. Examining Indonesia’s port security practices will also help to map the contradictions and implications of the use of civilian groups in Indonesia’s efforts to establish a democratic civil society. 

Outsourcing security has become one of the main features of Indonesia’s government policy in a bid to improve port security.[2] These civilian groups work in conjunction with the Indonesian Police, Army, Navy and Air Force in securing Indonesia’s maritime interests. This article asks a question related to this development: How do Indonesian officials perceive the use of militarised non-governmental organisations to help secure the country’s ports?  

In Indonesia there are around thirty organized paramilitary groups with an estimated membership of 700,000 people.[3] Some of these groups are attached to political parties like Gerakan Pemuda Kabah which is loosely affiliated with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party).[4] Others are linked to religious organizations, for instance Pemuda Anshor which is affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama. A small number of these groups are characterized as independent youth/gangster organizations that in the past gained state support during Soeharto’s New Order regime such as Pemuda Pancasila and Ikatan Pemuda Karya.[5]  

The involvement of militarised non-governmental groups in Indonesian security itself is not a new phenomenon. During the Indonesian war of independence, from 1945-1949, various civilian groups, often known as laskar were actively involvedin carrying out combat dutiesA member of Indonesian parliament recalled, “in Indonesia these non-governmental groups, the youth groups were the one who mobilized the communities in the fight for independence.”[6] In 1966 militarised civilian groups took part in the nation-wide anti-communist purges that resulted in at least half a million deaths.[7] During the Soeharto administration the role of militarised non-governmental actors was nurtured to protect the president’s family as well as to coerce students and political activists.[8] The centralised system of clientelism between state and these civilian groups was maintained until Soeharto’s fall in 1998.[9] In May 1998, the resignation of Indonesia’s President Soeharto, brought to an end the state’s authoritarian political system that had lasted for more than thirty years.[10] The end of the authoritarian system also marked a new era of political and security reform in Indonesia.  

Based on initial field work conducted in Indonesia I have found that despite reform the use of militarised non-governmental actors continues to be seen as a beneficial instrument by Indonesian decision makers. There is a widespread perception among officials and legislators in Indonesia regarding the “usefulness” of these groups as a means to complement existing regular security authorities. As an official from the Indonesian National Defence Council put it:

"The involvement of these actors [militarised non-governmental groups] has complicated the existing security system. We can deny the involvement of militarised non-governmental groups in security...however, at the practical level there is symbiotic mutualism between the groups and state. As they [militarised non-governmental groups] maintains security in some ports and border areas the formal security guards would no longer be needed in large numbers there. The formal security authorities will view that as long as the presence of civilian groups can secure the ports and border areas and no disturbance takes place then they these groups would be left alone. This is despite the system does not allow the participation of non-governmental groups in port or border security. Even the system forbids the establishment of border and port security from non-governmental groups or units that are associated with political parties."[11]  

This view was echoed by an official from the Indonesian Political, Legal and Security Affairs. He claimed that there is a need to regulate use of militarised non-governmental actors at ports and design a plan of operation. According to him “members of non-governmental groups could be recruited to be security officers.”[12] He argued that these militarised non-governmental organisations must meet the requirements for security outsourcing. Thus, they need to train their members to secure the movement of goods and people – possibly under the guidance of the police force – and establish official security companies.[13]  

The government officials’ view on the use of militarised non-governmental actors to improve port security is also shared among some members of the Indonesian parliament. Senators representing Jakarta and Riau for instance are very supportive of the activities of groups such as Pemuda Pancasila, Front Pembela Islam, Forum Betawi Rempug and Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (MKGR) in ports. A senator from Riau Islands claimed that groups such as MKGR are most useful to secure smaller ports in Riau Islands.[14] This group could help in securing the loading and unloading of goods and serve as mediators when labour demonstrations take place. A senator from Jakarta went further to argue that the use of local non-governmental groups by port operators should be seen as a form of corporate social responsibility of the port operator towards the local community.[15]  

Having surveyed the view of Indonesian officials and parliament members it could be concluded that although officials realised the challenges posed by the involvement of militarised non-governmental actors in port security or the security sector in general, they still view these actors as a useful resources to tap into. The involvement of civilian groups that are attached to political parties, linked to religious organisations, or are characterized as independent youth/gangster organisations in security represents a continuation in Indonesia’s security practices.

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[1] Sekretariat Jenderal Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan (2006: 58); M. Ford & L. Lyons (2013:215); A. Sciascia (2013).

[2] See Jakarta Post (29 June 2006); A. Sciascia (2013)

[3] H.S. Nordholt (2002:51) as cited in G.M. Sindre (2005: 69)

[4] V. Hadiz (2003: 603)

[5] V. Hadiz (2003: 603)

[6] Interview with a senator from Jakarta, Jakarta 21 August 2015.

[7] A. Tyson (2013:207)

[8] L. Ryter (1998: 46); B. Simpson (2013: 10)

[9] E. Aspinall (2013:33)

[10] R.W. Liddle (1999: 39)

[11] Interview with an official from the Indonesian National Defence Council, 7 August 2015.

[12] Interview with an official from the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, 21 August 2015.

[13] Interview with an official from the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, 21 August 2015.

[14] Interview with a senator from Riau Island, Jakarta, 18 August 2015.

[15] Interview with a senator from Jakarta, Jakarta, 18 August 2015.